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Species in the Age of Discordance:
Meeting Report and Introduction
Matthew H. Haber∗ and Daniel J. Molter†
In 2017, three interdisciplinary workshops were held on whether and how biological dis-
cordance might impact our views on species. Though the prompting focus of these work-
shops was genealogical discordance, the precise sense of ‘discordance’ was left intentionally
ambiguous.This was to encourage an examination of the question frommany different per-
spectives and to foster connections across disciplines. Participants included philosophers,
historians, and other social scientists, alongside a range of biologists representingmicrobiol-
ogy, population genetics, phylogenetics, invasion biology, herpetology, and ecology, among
other areas. Here, context is provided for those workshops and to help motivate why bio-
logical discordance generates useful interdisciplinary research problems, along with brief
summaries of the workshop papers included in this special issue.
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Part of the special issue Species in the Age of Discordance, guest-edited by Matthew H. Haber and
Daniel J. Molter.
1 Varieties of Discordance
The papers included in this special issue were selected from a series of three interdisciplinary
workshops titled Species in the Age of Discordance. Participants including philosophers, phylo-
geneticists, systematists, population geneticists, invasion biologists, historians, social scientists,
botanists, herpetologists, ichthyologists, and microbiologists, among others, were asked to con-
sider species in the context of discordance. The sense of “discordance” was left intentionally
ambiguous in the call for abstracts, as our goal was to examine this question from many differ-
ent perspectives, to seek out connections across disciplines, to think about the different ways
discordance surrounding species is conceived, and to ascertain how the varieties of discordance
might inform each other.
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Genealogical discordance, the fact that component lineages of biological systems often have
conflicting or incongruent histories, is the kind of discordance that prompted this project. Con-
sider for example the polar bears. Phylogenetic analysis of the history of mitochondrial DNA,
which is inherited matrilineally, reveals that the ancestors of polar bears and brown bears di-
verged into isolated lineages about 150,000 years ago. Phylogenetic analysis of nuclear DNA,
on the other hand, which is inherited from both parents, reveals a much earlier divergence
around 750,000 years ago. Did polar bears split from brown bears 150,000 years ago or 750,000
years ago? The answer is “yes.” Nuclear genes show that brown bears and polar bears began di-
verging at the earlier date, but at the later date a female brown bear mated with one or more
male polar bears and, by hybrid introgression, became the maternal ancestor of all extant polar
bears (Hailer et al. 2012; Kutschera et al. 2014).
Hybridization events, like the one that scrambled polar bear phylogeny, are just one way to
generate genealogical discordance, which also arises from horizontal gene transfer, gene dupli-
cation, and incomplete lineage sorting (Degnan and Rosenberg 2006). Attending to genealogi-
cal discordance forces us to reimagine what species and other evolutionary lineages are like, as
discordance runs counter to idealized conceptions of evolutionary lineages as spatiotemporally
discrete branches on an evolutionary tree. We’ve known since at least Hennig (1966) that phylo-
genetic trees are, to some extent, idealizations of history, but recent work in genomics (work that
attends to all the genes in a specimen, rather than sampling one or a few genes for barcoding)
suggests that the phylogenetic history of species might be so complex that tree models cannot
capture it. In place of tree thinking, some authors have suggested a switch to cloud thinking,
such that species are conceived as “clouds of gene histories” and represented with “cloudograms”
(Maddison 1997).
Though genealogical discordance was a primary focus of these workshops, other sorts of
discordance were centrally considered. Ecological disturbance, human intervention, migration
and invasion, and political/national boundaries all generate discordances that can impact species
identity and integrity, as well as the ways theoretical and operational species concepts are em-
ployed. A broad range of biologists, philosophers, historians, and social scientists were included
so that we could explore how these different kinds of discordance are interconnected. The work-
shops were interdisciplinary in the sense that researchers from many fields participated, but
they were also interdisciplinary in a further sense that they were directed towards very different
audiences at different venues.
The first meeting was a stand-alone workshop held at the University of Utah inMarch 2017;
forty-one papers and posters were presented by over fifty scholars, half of whom were biolo-
gists, the other half philosophers, historians, and social scientists of biology. Presenters ranged
from pre-doctoral students to senior scholars in their fields. The second and third workshops
were integrated into larger professional meetings. A session presented at the Society of Sys-
tematic Biologists Pre-Conference Workshop, prior to the 2017 Evolution Meeting, included
presentations from three biologists and three philosophers and was enthusiastically received
by a standing-room-only audience of mostly evolutionary biologists. There was a great deal of
interest in stepping back to examine how recent advances in systematics impact the study of
diversification and divergence of evolutionary lineages. The final workshop was an organized
session at the 2017 International Society for History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biol-
ogy (ISHPSSB) meeting.
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2 Paper Summaries
Matthew J. Barker’s (2019) “Species and Other Evolving Lineages as Feedback Systems” of-
fers a programmatic paper, proposing a hypothetical account of species conceived as evolving
metapopulation lineages, each held together as a unit of evolution by feedback processes. On
Barker’s theory, spatiotemporal and trait-space cohesion are both affected by feedback systems,
which, perhaps surprisingly, include trait similarity as part of the feedback process. Capacity to
interbreed and capacity to occupy a common niche are hallmarks of many species concepts, and
they function as elements of Barker’s feedback system. But given the post-Darwinian demise of
essentialism, trait similarity has recently been viewed as merely an effect of other factors which
mold a group of organisms into a single evolutionary unit. Barker argues that trait similarity is
no mere effect; trait similarity participates in feedback processes along with factors such as gene
flow and ecological niche to maintain a species as a single evolving unit.
Barker proposes a 3D model of metapopulation cohesion space, reminiscent of Godfrey-
Smith’s (2009) cube of graded Darwinian individuality. Beginning with a broadly promiscuous
metapopulation concept, one which includes any and all groups of organisms, Barker maps
each metapopulation onto a 3D space ofM values, whereM is the sum total of cohesive factors
operating in the metapopulation. The members of most arbitrarily defined metapopulations
do not participate in any common feedback processes at all, and therefore have M values of
zero. Paradigm, evolving metapopulations, characterized by high gene flow, universal mating
compatibility, and shared ecology, appear at the top of the M value scale. Barker speculates
that species might be metapopulations whose cohesion values cluster in a single region of M
space, and if this hypothesis is correct, then that region of M space could serve to define the
species category. Barker describes possible experiments to test this hypothesis and encourages
researchers to allocate resources to do just this.
Considering species of microbes, Ford Doolittle’s (2019) “Speciation without Species: A
Final Word” argues for an eliminative pluralism which recognizes multiple ways prokaryotes
sort themselves into species, but which denies there is one ontological species category. Central
to Doolittle’s approach is the idea that species are cohesive processes, and that processes can
cohere in a number of different ways. First, homologous recombination in bacteria can hold
lineages together as evolving units, similar to the way sexual recombination holds interbreeding
plant and animal species together, even though horizontal gene transfer blurs the boundaries
of microbial lineages and homologous recombination provides less cohesion than sex. Second,
adaptation to an ecological niche, especially when enabled by a point mutation that allows the
offspring of a single microbe to colonize a new substrate, results in “ecotype” species. These
are characterized by a strong founder effect, but, due to horizontal gene transfer, need not be
composed wholly of bacteria sharing a recent common ancestor. Pangenomes—groups of genes
propagating vertically and horizontally in a microbial network, but which are only partially
instantiated in any one microbe—mark the boundaries of yet another kind of cohesive and
evolving microbial lineage. Each of these kinds of cohesive groupings are taken to be species
by microbiologists, meaning that a selfsame bacterium can be a part of more than one species.
Doolittle argues this is not problematic. Species concepts are for Doolittle as gene concepts and
biological individuality concepts are for Ken Waters: tools of scientific investigation that need
not carve the world into discrete, non-overlapping units. Doolittle suggests that we can “save
all the babies” of speciation while throwing out the bathwater of a univocally defined species
category.
Noting that many biologists and philosophers embrace species pluralism, Marco Nathan’s
(2019) “Pluralism Is the Answer! What Is the Question?” argues that this term lacks a univo-
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cal meaning. Some authors use “pluralism” in reference to species heterogeneity—the view that
there are various kinds of species in nature, such as interbreeding species and species of asex-
ual microbes. Other authors use the term “pluralism” in reference to what Nathan calls theory
dependence—the idea that demarcating species is something scientists do, and do so always
according to some theory, aim, or purpose. Species heterogeneity recognizes multiple different
natural arrangements that count as species, and theory dependence recognizes no species apart
from those identified and classified for some scientific purpose. Nathan argues that neither
heterogeneity nor theory dependence implies anti-realism, as species monists have suggested
pluralism must.
Nathan examines three perspectives that have been described as species pluralism, the first
two exemplifying heterogeneity, and the third theory dependence. “Second order pluralism”
holds that all species are units of evolution, and hence provides a monistic definition of species
ontology, while recognizing a variety of ways to epistemically assess whether organisms belong
to a single evolving unit. “Eliminative pluralism”, a second kind of heterogeneity, holds that
there are multiple kinds of naturally demarcated lineages (clades, interbreeding lineages, and
ecological lineages), each of which should be recognized as distinct rather than lumped into
a single species category. Nathan argues that eliminative pluralism is actually species monism,
because if the species category is replaced by other categories of cohesive lineages, then the
species category remains monistically defined, even though it is an empty category.
On the other hand, Nathan considers “species pragmatism” to be true pluralism. Pragma-
tism holds that the species concept is central to biology, so it cannot be eliminated, but because
species are always demarcated according to some purpose, and because there are many cross-
cutting purposes, the species category cannot be univocally defined. While Nathan takes theory
dependence to be a more genuine form of pluralism than species heterogeneity, his aim is not to
police the language, but rather to show that species heterogeneity and theory dependence need
not come together as a package. Because “pluralism” refers both to heterogeneity and theory de-
pendence, and because these two come apart, “pluralism” cannot be univocally defined. Nathan
concludes that the question “Should we be species pluralists?” is not well formed, and would be
better replaced by more precise questions about heterogeneity and theory dependence.
Makmiller Pedroso’s (2019) “Forming Lineages by Sticking Together” notes that “Individ-
ual thinking” identifies species with evolving lineages, and treats reproducing parts of species
as individuals, on account that reproduction is what generates a lineage. Here he suggests that
individual thinking can be extended to include multispecies aggregates of microbes as lineage-
generating individuals, but in order to do so, we must recognize that ‘lineage generating’ is a
graded rather than a bivalent condition, and wemust attend to lineages beyond those which con-
nect parents and offspring. Biofilms composed of multiple species of bacteria do not reproduce
by generating well-defined parent-offspring lineages, but Pedroso argues they are nonetheless
individual lineage generators, insofar as they have evolved such that some of their component
species lineages propagate in tandem.
Biofilms are aggregates of numerous microbial species which do not reproduce together as
a unit. However, biofilms are spatially structured, because cells of cooperating species tend to
stick together and segregate themselves from non-cooperating species. Because the lineages of
certain component microbes stick together in a biofilm, when environmental conditions break
the biofilm apart, lineages of stuck together microbes can disperse as a unit and found biofilms in
new locations. It follows that even though a biofilm as a whole does not generate parent offspring
lineages, it can still achieve a degree of evolutionary individuality, by generating lineages in
which some of its components co-disperse.
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Aleta Quinn’s (2019) “Diagnosing Discordance: Signal in Data, Conflict in Paradigms”
identifies debates over the principle of total evidence as an important thread tracing through
three recent debates in phylogenetics: (i) parsimony versus maximum likelihood methods, (ii)
character congruence versus consensus trees, and (iii) concatenation versus coalescence approa-
ches. This provides an illuminating and novel way to understand these debates and how they
are connected, while offering opportunities to add clarity to those (ongoing) discussions. For
example, Quinn convincingly argues that Nixon and Carpenter’s (1996) defense of “simultane-
ous analysis” ought to be understood in terms of defending the principle of total evidence. On
Quinn’s account, Nixon and Carpenter are advancing this argument in service of a defense of
parsimony approaches in phylogenetics. Quinn suggests that this is to conflate debates over the
utility of total versus partitioned evidence with debates over particular methodologies in sys-
tematics, where how the former plays out need not be decisive with regard to debates on the
latter. With regard to the more recent debates over concatenation versus coalescence methods,
Quinn argues that concatenation (total evidence) approaches may conflate genuine genealogical
discordance with error, and, thus, fail to reconstruct trees correctly when subsets of data ought
to be prioritized. Quinn’s analysis also provides an important case study for how the principle
of total evidence plays out in scientific practice, and an examination of the way that entrenched
commitments in the sciences can weave in and out of different debates. Seeing those contribu-
tions helps identify those debates that appear novel as part of a longer-lived and larger recurring
disagreement.
Jason Sexton’s (2019) “The Adaptive Continuum and How Species Succeed and Fail” ar-
gues that a species’ failure to adapt can have three causes: chance, time, and speciation. Chance
events, especially those which cause large-scale rapid changes to the environment, are well-
recognized causes of extinction. Sexton argues that lack of time to evolve after a speciation
event can also lead to extinction, as can the budding off of new species. Sexton compares the
emergence, evolution, and budding off of new species to life cycles of organisms, and he argues
that species can fail to adapt at each of these stages. Species can fail in the early stage of this cycle
by not acquiring sufficient genetic variation to adapt to changing environments, and they can
fail in later stages by budding off incipient species. The incipient species’ reproductive isolation
deprives the parent species of part of its pool of genetic resources, thus inhibiting its ability to
evolve in response to changing environments, including competition from the newly generated
species.
Sexton describes an adaptive continuum in which extinction events, while decreasing adap-
tation at the level of species, can increase adaptation at other levels of organization.The adaptive
continuum ranges from genes, at the bottom of the hierarchy, up through species to supraspe-
cific clades and the entire tree of life.The adaptive continuum also cuts across species boundaries,
as gene combinations from multiple species are frequently adaptive at the level of symbiotic col-
lectives. Sexton describes a continuously expanding tree of life, evolving into ever new niches,
in which adaptation occurs at numerous of levels of organization, such that losses in adaptation
through extinction at one level are offset by increases in adaptation at other levels. A species’ fail-
ure to adapt, and hence its extinction, is not a net loss for adaptation, as new adaptive lineages
replace those which are extinguished through chance, lack of time to evolve, or the ordinary
replacement of parent species by daughter species at the end of parent species’ life cycles.
As biological taxonomy was emerging as a science in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, European invaders were colonizing the New World, and their views of the indigenous
peoples they conquered, and interbred with, were heavily influenced by the new biology. Er-
ica Torrens and Ana Barahona’s (2019) “Castes and Trees: Tracing the Link between Euro-
pean and Mexican Representations of Human Taxonomy” relates the role of pre-Darwinian
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and Darwinian thinking to popular views of races and castes in the colonial period of Mexico.
Visual representations of humans as parts of a larger biological order, specifically tree models
from thinkers such as Ernst Haeckel and Manuel Ortega, as well as Ignacio María Barreda’s
artistic representations of a hierarchy of mixed-race castes, profoundly informed the national
consciousness before and during Mexico’s transition into a nation state. White Europeans were
universally depicted at the top of these hierarchies, which often misconstrued evolution as an or-
derly and progressive march toward increasing perfection. Unsurprisingly, these images, which
represented false and misleading evolutionary histories, were frequently misunderstood by the
public as providing scientific support for the racist zeitgeist and white supremacy of the colonial
period.
One prominent understanding of species is that they are monophyletic groups, clades, or
branches on the tree of life. These branches are parts of a larger phylogeny, but what exactly is a
phylogeny? Joel Velasco’s (2019) “TheFoundations of Concordance views of Phylogeny” notes
that phylogenies can be conceived as mapping the branching patterns of organism lineages,
as they are held together by reproductive interactions and diverge according to reproductive
isolation, or phylogenies can be understood as mapping the branching structures of replicating
gene lineages. The first kind of phylogeny Velasco calls “species trees” and the latter “gene trees”.
Attempts to map species trees onto gene trees is complicated by genealogical discordance—the
fact that genes in a species have their own unique histories and branching patterns, each different
from the others and from the branching patterns of species trees. Velasco argues that if we want
to define phylogeny in terms of the actual flow of genetic information, including horizontal gene
transfer, then it makes sense to attend to all the gene trees within a species. Using a genealogical
concordance approach to phylogenetic systematics, we sort organisms into monophyletic groups
just in case their gene trees coalesce more recently within the group than outside the group.
Velasco considers five different algorithms used to generate concordance trees, including full
coalescence, majority coalescence, and plurality coalescence, along with mathematically more
complex models such as the “greedy tree”, which combines elements of the other approaches.
Any of these algorithms can be used to generate a primary concordance tree that is taken for tax-
onomic purposes to be an estimate of the species tree. The concordance tree is only an estimate;
concordance trees and species trees can come apart. Velasco argues that the mismatch between
species trees and genealogical concordance trees is unproblematic. When a concordance tree
fails to map onto a species tree, it does not make the concordance tree a bad estimate of the
phylogeny, as the concordance tree just is the phylogeny. Species trees and concordance trees
represent two distinct aspects of evolutionary history, and both are useful, though perhaps for
different purposes. Velasco concludes that if phylogeny is understood to be a history of the flow
of genetic resources, then taxa are best understood in terms of primary concordance trees, irre-
spective of whether the primary concordance tree is coincident with a species tree understood
in terms of reproductively isolated organism lineages.
Matthew H. Haber’s (2019) “Species in the Age of Discordance” offers a broad view of
how genealogical discordance is impacting the way we consider species. He argues that as the
relatively recent appreciation for the degree and breadth of different kinds of discordance in
biology has grown, this is becoming increasingly impactful on conceptualization, theory, and
practice in phylogenetic systematics. More specifically, he considers how discordance is chang-
ing the contours of debates over species, and how a finer-grained understanding of the different
kinds of discordance presents both opportunities and challenges for phylogeny reconstruction.
In both cases, entrenched commitments are being challenged, but the upshot is a more nuanced
and sophisticated approach to studying divergence and diversification in biology. Haber iden-
tifies these as examples of scientific progress that he calls “productive disruptions”. Moreover,
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the breadth of modes of discordance have also spurred biologists to work across disciplines,
partnering in exciting ways to utilize what we are learning about discordance to gain a deeper
understanding of a range of systems from developmental, evolutionary, and phylogenetic tradi-
tions.
3 Summary
Biological discordance is a timely and relevant topic to examine. Biologists are still coming to
grips with the extent and scope of genealogical discordance, and we are still in the early stages of
reflecting on the implications it might have for central conceptual, methodological, and theoret-
ical commitments in biology. Because the mechanisms of genealogical discordance draw from
other fields, e.g., developmental biology and microbiology, this also presents an opportunity
to synthesize work across disciplines, in what Minelli (2009) calls a ‘phylo-evo-devo’ approach.
For fields beyond systematics, the topic is pressing due to the accelerated impacts on threatened
or endangered species due to climate change or human-mediated migration and displacement.
The cross-disciplinary interest in these workshops is evidence that biologists are keen to engage
with philosophers and other humanists and social scientists on how to navigate the intersection
of scientific investigation with the practical and political implications of their work (see too
Laplane et al. 2019). We hope this special issue will help facilitate that ongoing discussion.
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